The JSON-RPC tools in com.rabbitmq.tools.jsonrpc perform Class.forName(javaReturnType) with initialize=true on class names received from untrusted AMQP messages, without any validation or allowlist.
Vulnerable code (ProcedureDescription.java:101-127):
When a JsonRpcClient connects, it calls system.describe and receives a service description from the AMQP queue. The response JSON includes javaReturnType fields that are reflectively set via JSONUtil.tryFill(), triggering setJavaReturnType() → computeReturnTypeAsJavaClass() → Class.forName(javaReturnType).
Attack scenario:
- Victim uses
JsonRpcClient to connect to a JSON-RPC service via RabbitMQ
- Attacker (co-tenant on shared broker, or MITM) intercepts the
system.describe request
- Attacker responds with crafted
javaReturnType values
- Victim's client calls
Class.forName(attackerInput) with default initialize=true
- Static initializers of attacker-specified classes execute in victim's JVM
Additionally, the loaded class from getReturnType() is passed to mapper.parse(replyStr, expectedType) at JsonRpcClient.java:168, potentially enabling type-confusion.
Recommended fix: Use Class.forName(javaReturnType, false, classLoader) to prevent static initializer execution, or add an allowlist of permitted return types.
CWE: CWE-470
Reply from reporter (2026-06-29): Thanks for the quick turnaround. Fix looks good. Looking forward to the CVE assignment.
References
The JSON-RPC tools in
com.rabbitmq.tools.jsonrpcperformClass.forName(javaReturnType)withinitialize=trueon class names received from untrusted AMQP messages, without any validation or allowlist.Vulnerable code (
ProcedureDescription.java:101-127):When a
JsonRpcClientconnects, it callssystem.describeand receives a service description from the AMQP queue. The response JSON includesjavaReturnTypefields that are reflectively set viaJSONUtil.tryFill(), triggeringsetJavaReturnType()→computeReturnTypeAsJavaClass()→Class.forName(javaReturnType).Attack scenario:
JsonRpcClientto connect to a JSON-RPC service via RabbitMQsystem.describerequestjavaReturnTypevaluesClass.forName(attackerInput)with defaultinitialize=trueAdditionally, the loaded class from
getReturnType()is passed tomapper.parse(replyStr, expectedType)atJsonRpcClient.java:168, potentially enabling type-confusion.Recommended fix: Use
Class.forName(javaReturnType, false, classLoader)to prevent static initializer execution, or add an allowlist of permitted return types.CWE: CWE-470
Reply from reporter (2026-06-29): Thanks for the quick turnaround. Fix looks good. Looking forward to the CVE assignment.
References