Summary
Several of AIIR's verification and policy paths could return a success/"verified" result without actually enforcing the control they represent — they could fail open rather than fail closed. For a tool whose purpose is trustworthy verification, a consumer relying on these gates may have treated unverified or non-conforming input as verified.
Found during an internal adversarial hardening review of AIIR (not a third-party audit). All paths are fixed in 1.7.0.
Affected paths
- A
require_signing policy gate could be satisfied by a forgeable/empty field, so an unsigned or forged-bundle receipt could pass a "signing required" check without a valid signature.
- A CI verification path could report
success regardless of the underlying verification result.
- A release-verification gate could advertise policy limits it did not actually enforce.
- A signature-verification path could be silently skipped for certain input categories, exiting success without verifying.
Impact
A consumer relying on these gates (e.g. require_signing, release/policy verification, or the CI check) to block unsigned, forged, or non-conforming receipts could have received a false "verified"/"pass". Exploitation requires reliance on the affected gate; it does not forge valid signatures, nor does it compromise content-addressing or correctly-signed receipts.
Patches
Fixed in 1.7.0. Every affected path now fails closed, each with a regression test. Upgrade to aiir >= 1.7.0.
Workarounds
None for earlier versions other than upgrading. Full cryptographic Sigstore verification (pip install aiir[sign], --verify-signature with --signer-identity/--signer-issuer) provides defense in depth.
Scope note
This advisory covers code present in released versions (< 1.7.0). Separately, an unreleased agent-receipt feature had pre-release forgery findings fixed before it shipped — those were never in a released version and are out of scope.
References
Summary
Several of AIIR's verification and policy paths could return a success/"verified" result without actually enforcing the control they represent — they could fail open rather than fail closed. For a tool whose purpose is trustworthy verification, a consumer relying on these gates may have treated unverified or non-conforming input as verified.
Found during an internal adversarial hardening review of AIIR (not a third-party audit). All paths are fixed in 1.7.0.
Affected paths
require_signingpolicy gate could be satisfied by a forgeable/empty field, so an unsigned or forged-bundle receipt could pass a "signing required" check without a valid signature.successregardless of the underlying verification result.Impact
A consumer relying on these gates (e.g.
require_signing, release/policy verification, or the CI check) to block unsigned, forged, or non-conforming receipts could have received a false "verified"/"pass". Exploitation requires reliance on the affected gate; it does not forge valid signatures, nor does it compromise content-addressing or correctly-signed receipts.Patches
Fixed in 1.7.0. Every affected path now fails closed, each with a regression test. Upgrade to
aiir >= 1.7.0.Workarounds
None for earlier versions other than upgrading. Full cryptographic Sigstore verification (
pip install aiir[sign],--verify-signaturewith--signer-identity/--signer-issuer) provides defense in depth.Scope note
This advisory covers code present in released versions (
< 1.7.0). Separately, an unreleased agent-receipt feature had pre-release forgery findings fixed before it shipped — those were never in a released version and are out of scope.References