Summary
GRPC.Codec.Erlpack.decode/2 calls :erlang.binary_to_term/1 directly on the raw gRPC message body without the :safe option. Any unauthenticated peer that can reach a gRPC endpoint with Content-Type: application/grpc+erlpack can crash the entire BEAM node via atom table exhaustion or, if a decoded fun term flows into a call site that invokes it, achieve remote code execution inside the server process.
Details
Root cause — lib/grpc/codec/erlpack.ex implements decode/2 as a bare :erlang.binary_to_term(binary) call with no :safe flag, no size limit, and no type validation. This has two independent exploitation paths:
1. DoS via atom exhaustion — BEAM atoms are never garbage-collected and the global atom table is bounded (~1,048,576 entries). A crafted payload encoding large numbers of fresh atoms saturates the table and crashes the entire VM, taking down all applications on the node.
2. RCE via fun materialization — Without :safe, binary_to_term/1 reconstructs fun and external-fun terms from wire data. If the decoded value reaches any call site that applies it (e.g. Enum.map, Task.async, direct invocation), attacker-controlled code executes inside the server process.
Configuration requirement: GRPC.Codec.Erlpack is not registered by default and must be explicitly added to the server's codecs option.
PoC
- Start a gRPC server with
codecs: [GRPC.Codec.Erlpack].
- Open an HTTP/2 connection to the server.
- Send a gRPC-framed POST to any RPC path with
Content-Type: application/grpc+erlpack and a body of :erlang.term_to_binary(fn -> <malicious_code> end).
- The server's
decode/2 materializes the fun; any downstream call site that invokes the decoded value executes the attacker's code.
- For DoS only: send payloads encoding fresh atoms in a loop until the atom table is exhausted and the VM crashes.
Impact
Affects grpc ≥ 0.4.0. Any server that explicitly registers GRPC.Codec.Erlpack is vulnerable to unauthenticated node-level DoS and potentially RCE.
References
References
Summary
GRPC.Codec.Erlpack.decode/2calls:erlang.binary_to_term/1directly on the raw gRPC message body without the:safeoption. Any unauthenticated peer that can reach a gRPC endpoint withContent-Type: application/grpc+erlpackcan crash the entire BEAM node via atom table exhaustion or, if a decoded fun term flows into a call site that invokes it, achieve remote code execution inside the server process.Details
Root cause —
lib/grpc/codec/erlpack.eximplementsdecode/2as a bare:erlang.binary_to_term(binary)call with no:safeflag, no size limit, and no type validation. This has two independent exploitation paths:1. DoS via atom exhaustion — BEAM atoms are never garbage-collected and the global atom table is bounded (~1,048,576 entries). A crafted payload encoding large numbers of fresh atoms saturates the table and crashes the entire VM, taking down all applications on the node.
2. RCE via fun materialization — Without
:safe,binary_to_term/1reconstructs fun and external-fun terms from wire data. If the decoded value reaches any call site that applies it (e.g.Enum.map,Task.async, direct invocation), attacker-controlled code executes inside the server process.Configuration requirement:
GRPC.Codec.Erlpackis not registered by default and must be explicitly added to the server'scodecsoption.PoC
codecs: [GRPC.Codec.Erlpack].Content-Type: application/grpc+erlpackand a body of:erlang.term_to_binary(fn -> <malicious_code> end).decode/2materializes the fun; any downstream call site that invokes the decoded value executes the attacker's code.Impact
Affects
grpc≥ 0.4.0. Any server that explicitly registersGRPC.Codec.Erlpackis vulnerable to unauthenticated node-level DoS and potentially RCE.References
References