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Klever: Marketplace settlement mints KLV when referral % + royalty % exceed the bid (negative seller share silently skipped)

Critical severity GitHub Reviewed Published Jun 22, 2026 in klever-io/klever-go • Updated Aug 28, 2026

Package

gomod github.com/klever-io/klever-go (Go)

Affected versions

< 1.7.19

Patched versions

1.7.19

Description

Summary

When a marketplace order is settled (MarketBuy / BuyItNow, and auction Claim), the buyer's
payment is split three ways — referral, royalties, and the seller (market-order owner)
remainder
:

marketOwnerAmount = CurrentBid − referralAmount − royaltiesAmount

Referral and royalties are paid out unconditionally, but the seller remainder is only paid
when positive (computeMarketOwnerAmount returns Ok and pays nothing when the amount is
<= 0). When referral% + royalty% exceeds 100% of the bid, marketOwnerAmount goes negative
and is silently skipped — so the marketplace pays out more KLV / sale currency than the buyer
paid in
, minting the difference out of thin air.

The combined ceiling royalty% + referral% <= 100% is checked once, at listing time (Sell).
But the two percentages are sourced asymmetrically at settlement:

  • referral % is snapshotted into the order at Sell (MarketOrderData.ReferralPercentage);
  • royalty % is never snapshotted — it is read live from the asset at buy time
    (asset.Royalties.MarketPercentage).

So the listing-time invariant is a time-of-check/time-of-use guarantee only. After a valid
listing, the asset owner raises the royalty MarketPercentage via AssetTrigger → UpdateRoyalties;
at the next buy the live royalty plus the snapshotted referral exceed 100%, and the settlement mints
the overflow. The minted funds land in attacker-controlled referral / royalty addresses.

This was actively exploited on mainnet (see Evidence), minting tens of millions of KLV before
the emergency guard was deployed.

Affected component

  • Repository: klever-io/klever-go (node).
  • Settlement / mint site: core/kapp/market/market.goexecuteBuyMarket (L575+),
    computeReferralAmount (L361+), computeRoyaltiesAmount (L490+),
    computeRoyaltiesFixedDeposit (L443+), computeMarketOwnerAmount (L540+).
  • TOCTOU sources: Sell combined check (market.go:908), order snapshot of referral but not
    royalty (market.go:997), live royalty mutation via
    core/kapp/kda/trigger.gohandleUpdateRoyaltiesNFTandSFT (L613+, sets
    asset.Royalties.MarketPercentage at L670).
  • Reachable from both Buy (BuyItNow, market.go:204+) and auction Claim
    (market.go:705, market.go:731).
  • Pre-fix: not gated by any fork flag — exploitable on mainnet. The fix is gated behind the new
    FixMarketBuyOverflow activation-epoch flag.

Root cause

1. Settlement pays referral + royalty unconditionally, seller remainder only if positive

core/kapp/market/market.goexecuteBuyMarket (L575+):

referralAmount, _  := tools.ComputePercentageI64(marketOrder.CurrentBid,
                          int64(marketOrder.ReferralPercentage), ...)        // L583: SNAPSHOT referral %
royaltiesAmount, _ := tools.ComputePercentageI64(marketOrder.CurrentBid,
                          int64(asset.Royalties.MarketPercentage), ...)      // L587: LIVE royalty %
marketOwnerAmount := marketOrder.CurrentBid - referralAmount - royaltiesAmount  // L591: can go negative

// ---- FIX (FixMarketBuyOverflow), added by the patch ----
if m.forkController.FixMarketBuyOverflow() && marketOwnerAmount < 0 {         // L593-596
    ctx.Receipts().AddError(ctx.ContractID(), common.ErrFieldInvalidRoyalties, common.ErrInvalidValue.Error())
    return transaction.Transaction_AmountInvalid, common.ErrInvalidValue
}

m.computeReferralAmount(ctx, marketOrder, referralAmount, currencyID)   // pays referral in full
m.computeRoyaltiesFixedDeposit(ctx, marketOrder, asset)                 // pays fixed royalty (KLV)
m.computeRoyaltiesAmount(ctx, marketOrder, asset, currencyID, royaltiesAmount) // pays % royalty in full
m.computeMarketOwnerAmount(ctx, marketOrder, currencyID, marketOwnerAmount)    // <-- skips when <= 0

computeMarketOwnerAmount (L540-542) — the silent skip:

func (m *marketKapp) computeMarketOwnerAmount(... marketOwnerAmount int64) (... , error) {
	if marketOwnerAmount <= 0 {
		return transaction.Transaction_Ok, nil   // negative seller share dropped, NO error
	}
	// ... AddToBalance(marketOwnerAmount) ...
}

Meanwhile computeReferralAmount (L376) and computeRoyaltiesAmount (L515) each AddToBalance(...)
the full computed amount with no matching debit from the buyer beyond the single
bidderAcc.SubFromBalance(amount) taken in Buy (market.go:301).

Conservation breaks: buyer is debited bid once; recipients are credited
referralAmount + royaltiesAmount. When that sum > bid, the surplus
(referralAmount + royaltiesAmount − bid) is minted.

2. The combined ≤100% invariant is enforced only at listing time

Sell (market.go:908) correctly rejects a listing whose combined cut exceeds 100%:

if asset.Royalties.MarketPercentage + marketplace.ReferralPercentage > core.HundredPercent {
	return transaction.Transaction_ParameterInvalid, common.ErrInvalidValue
}

…and snapshots referral into the order, but not royalty (market.go:997-998):

marketOrder := &kapps.MarketOrderData{
	// ...
	ReferralPercentage:    marketplace.ReferralPercentage, // snapshotted
	RoyaltiesFixedDeposit: asset.Royalties.MarketFixed,    // snapshotted
	// NOTE: asset.Royalties.MarketPercentage is NOT snapshotted -> read live at buy
}

MarketOrderData has no field for the royalty percentage (kapps/market.pb.go), so settlement
always re-reads it live from the (mutable) asset.

3. Royalty % is mutable after listing

core/kapp/kda/trigger.gohandleUpdateRoyaltiesNFTandSFT (L613+) lets the asset owner overwrite
asset.Royalties.MarketPercentage (L670) with only a per-field <= 100% check (CheckValid100Params,
L651) — it has no knowledge of any outstanding marketplace listing's snapshotted referral. So the
owner can list at, e.g., referral 100% / royalty 0% (sum 100%, passes Sell), then raise royalty to
100%, making the buy-time sum 200%.

The shipped emergency-guard source documents this exact vector:
"The royalty percentage is read live at buy time, so a listing made now can be weaponised later
via UpdateRoyalties."
(common/emergencyGuard.go)

Net effect: referralAmount + royaltiesAmount = bid + bid = 2·bid; marketOwnerAmount = −bid
(skipped); bid KLV minted per settlement, paid to attacker-controlled addresses.


Proof of Concept

A. Committed regression test (deterministic, runnable today)

core/kapp/market/market_test.goTestMarketKApp_ExecuteBuyMarket_RoyaltyReferralInflation.
It builds an order with ReferralPercentage = 100% and an asset with MarketPercentage = 100%
(the attacker is both the referral and the royalty address), then settles a bid of
25,600,000 KLV (25600000000000 base units):

go test ./core/kapp/market/ -run TestMarketKApp_ExecuteBuyMarket_RoyaltyReferralInflation -v
  • FixDisabled_MintsKLVFromThinAir: settlement returns Ok; the attacker address ends with
    2·bid credited while only bid was paid in — i.e. bid KLV minted.
  • FixEnabled_RejectsInflation: with FixMarketBuyOverflow on, settlement returns
    Transaction_AmountInvalid and the attacker balance stays 0no payout runs.

B. End-to-end on a local node (the real attack path)

A single-node local network is sufficient. The exploit is four transactions from one ordinary
funded account; nothing privileged is required.

  1. Create an NFT collection you own, with royalties.marketPercentage = 0 and a royalties
    address you control.
  2. Create a marketplace with referralPercentage = 10000 (100%) and a referral address you
    control (CreateMarketplace).
  3. List one NFT for sale (Sell) on that marketplace. The Sell check passes because
    0 (royalty) + 10000 (referral) = 10000 = HundredPercent. The order snapshots
    ReferralPercentage = 10000.
  4. Raise the royalty on the asset to 100% (AssetTrigger / UpdateRoyalties,
    marketPercentage = 10000). Allowed: the per-field check passes and the live combined invariant
    is never re-evaluated against the open listing.
  5. Buy the listing (MarketBuy) from a second account (or settle the auction via Claim).
    referralAmount = bid, royaltiesAmount = bid, marketOwnerAmount = −bid (skipped). Your
    referral + royalty addresses receive 2·bid; the buyer paid bid; bid KLV is minted.

Because the attacker controls buyer, seller, referral and royalty addresses, the only real cost is
transaction fees; the cycle is repeatable until supply targets are met.


Evidence

Regression test (local, verbatim)

=== RUN   TestMarketKApp_ExecuteBuyMarket_RoyaltyReferralInflation
=== RUN   TestMarketKApp_ExecuteBuyMarket_RoyaltyReferralInflation/FixDisabled_MintsKLVFromThinAir
=== RUN   TestMarketKApp_ExecuteBuyMarket_RoyaltyReferralInflation/FixEnabled_RejectsInflation
--- PASS: TestMarketKApp_ExecuteBuyMarket_RoyaltyReferralInflation (0.00s)
    --- PASS: TestMarketKApp_ExecuteBuyMarket_RoyaltyReferralInflation/FixDisabled_MintsKLVFromThinAir (0.00s)
    --- PASS: TestMarketKApp_ExecuteBuyMarket_RoyaltyReferralInflation/FixEnabled_RejectsInflation (0.00s)
PASS
ok  	github.com/klever-io/klever-go/core/kapp/market	0.279s

FixDisabled asserts the attacker balance equals 2·bid = 51,200,000 KLV for a single settlement
(bid = 25,600,000 KLV), with bid of that minted. FixEnabled asserts rejection and a 0
balance.

Mainnet exploitation (observed)

The bug was exploited in production, and was detected and characterised externally by the
community monitoring project KleverPuls / kpulse.tech before the root
cause was known internally. Over a ~24h window kpulse isolated a single wallet (opened
2026-06-04, ~204 transactions in ~24h, funded only by a ~242K KLV KuCoin withdrawal, no
treasury/foundation funding) that:

  • self-issued 3 NFT collections named "InflationPOC" and wash-traded one (NFLATION-ESGO/1)
    29 times
    through self-created marketplaces — ~$450K of artificial, economically empty NFT
    volume
    ;
  • swapped the proceeds KLV → USDC / USDT / WBTC / WETH on KleverSwap and bridged ~$72K of value
    to Ethereum
    via wrapped-asset burns over 24h (USDC −12,487 ≈ $12.5K; USDT −26,362 ≈ $26.4K; WBTC
    −0.31 ≈ $19.6K; WETH −7.55 ≈ $14K);
  • surfaced a spurious "1.86B KLV outflow" headline that kpulse correctly identified as a
    wash-trade receipt-doubling artifact with small real net KLV flow.

That "doubling of marketplace receipts" is precisely the on-chain signature of this bug: each
abusive settlement pays out a referral cut (bid) plus a royalty cut (bid) while the buyer paid
only bid once — the market contract emits ~2× the value it took in, which is the mint. The
attacker's self-issued collection and self-created marketplaces are exactly the self-dealing setup the
regression test reproduces (the test reuses the real on-chain identifiers: collectionID = "NFLATION-ESGO", asset 1, market name "Inflation Market").

kpulse could not determine the cause from on-chain data alone and flagged the activity for
confirmation; the Klever core team then traced it to the referral+royalty settlement defect described
above and shipped the emergency guard + protocol fix.

Each abusive settlement minted one bid of KLV; the observed bid was 25,600,000 KLV, repeated and
funnelled through a short hop chain before being swapped and bridged. The emergency guard
(common/emergencyGuard.go) blocks the following observed sender public keys (hex):

Public key (hex) Address Role (observed)
54ea28e527d4136508be955374afa54a8c25c19a48c674f412f7ce02db0f4e1b klv12n4z3ef86sfk2z97j4fhfta9f2xztsv6frr8faqj7l8q9kc0fcdsfjfqez root / minter
bb687dbba23e1844fec674a32cb8809f0d3207506c53fc3d637e40dc56708d63 klv1hd58mwaz8cvyflkxwj3jewyqnuxnyp6sd3flc0tr0eqdc4ns343skngdjq collector hop (~125M KLV)
77388d3dfe6cd88e8da723254c11abf3d9cccb6fb77b000e5038fc3ff92b964d klv1wuug6007dnvgard8yvj5cydt70vuejm0kaasqrjs8r7rl7ftjexsglalf6 direct recipient (25.6M, idle)
a196789b026f996867f08317cc6c5a4eb9ad3a59b1be3716420bc8692d4c3048 klv15xt83xczd7vkselssvtucmz6f6u66wjekxlrw9jzp0yxjt2vxpyq2nawrw hop-2 recipient (25M)

The single-bid per-settlement size (25.6M KLV) matches the "direct recipient, 25.6M" entry, and the
~125M at the collector hop is consistent with roughly five abusive settlements.


Impact

  • Unbounded inflation of KLV (and of any sale currency used for the listing), repeatable for only
    transaction fees, by any account that creates its own collection + marketplace.
  • The minted KLV is created by direct AddToBalance to attacker addresses (no tracked Mint), so
    the asset's booked supply does not change — the inflation is off the books and only detectable
    by summing balances / auditing receipts (it surfaces on-chain as doubled marketplace receipts).
  • Realized impact (observed): the attacker minted KLV via ~29 self-dealt settlements, swapped to
    stable/wrapped assets on KleverSwap, and off-ramped ~$72K to Ethereum via the bridge (USDC,
    USDT, WBTC, WETH) before the emergency guard halted the activity, alongside ~$450K of artificial
    NFT wash-trade volume.
  • Total loss of economic integrity for all KLV / token holders.

Who can exploit it / prerequisites

  • Any account that can pay the one-time collection-create + marketplace-create fees and tx
    fees. No roles, admin, or allowlist.
  • Any client. The settlement is triggered by standard MarketBuy / Claim contracts POSTed to
    the public, unauthenticated /transaction/send RPC (network/api/transaction/routes.go,
    SendTX / BroadcastTX). The operator CLI, the SDKs, or a hand-signed curl all work.
  • Deterministic; the abusive state is reached with one extra UpdateRoyalties after a normal listing.

Remediation

Shipped as a layered response (embargoed):

Layer 0 — emergency guard (deployed first, fork-proof) — GHSA-p7gw rc1

common/emergencyGuard.go + data/transaction/emergencyGuard.go: matching transactions are kept
out of blocks this node proposes (core/process/block/preprocess/transactions.go) and refused at
the node API (node.go SendTransaction / SendBulkTransactions). It never changes block
validity
, so a partial-fleet rollout cannot fork the chain. It blocks the known attacker senders
(all contract types) plus all MarketBuy, Sell, and CreateMarketplace / ConfigMarketplace
operations while the protocol fix rolls out. Enforcement is by proposer cooperation, not protocol —
coverage equals the share of block producers running the guard.

Layer 1 — protocol fix (consensus, epoch-gated) — GHSA-p7gw rc2

core/kapp/market/market.go:593 rejects the settlement when marketOwnerAmount < 0, before any
payout runs
, returning Transaction_AmountInvalid. Gated behind the new FixMarketBuyOverflow
activation-epoch flag (config/enableEpochs.*, core/fork/forks.go, core/interface.go) so
historical blocks reprocess identically. Covered by
TestMarketKApp_ExecuteBuyMarket_RoyaltyReferralInflation.

Recommended hardening (defense in depth)

  1. Snapshot the royalty % into MarketOrderData at Sell (as referral already is) and pay from
    the snapshot, eliminating the TOCTOU entirely; or re-evaluate the combined
    referral% + royalty% <= 100% invariant at settlement.
  2. Treat a negative seller remainder as a hard error everywhere, and only treat exactly 0 as a
    no-op skip (computeMarketOwnerAmount), so a future regression aborts the tx instead of minting.
  3. After splitting a payment pool, assert conservation (referral + royalties + ownerShare == bid)
    so any drift aborts the transaction.

Notes

  • Triggered by both BuyItNow (Buy) and auction settlement (Claim).
  • The same family of "pay full cut, silently drop the negative remainder" minting also exists in the
    royalty-split paths and is tracked separately under GHSA-cgc5-v3f2-8m2v (split-royalty uint32
    overflow). This advisory covers the top-level referral+royalty > bid case; the
    FixMarketBuyOverflow guard here only checks marketOwnerAmount, not intra-split over-payments.

Acknowledgments

  • KleverPuls / kpulse.tech — community monitoring project that first
    detected and characterised the exploitation in the wild
    . kpulse isolated the attacker wallet and
    its "InflationPOC" collections, identified the marketplace wash-trading of NFLATION-ESGO/1 and the
    KleverSwap → bridge off-ramp (~$72K to Ethereum), and flagged the anomalous doubling of
    marketplace receipts — the exact on-chain signature of this bug — prompting the incident response
    that led to this fix. The root cause was then identified and remediated by the Klever core team.

Source

  • Vulnerable / fixed code: core/kapp/market/market.go:540-545,575-596,908,997-998,
    core/kapp/kda/trigger.go:613-676, core/process/kda/assetHelper.go:101,
    tools/converters.go:102, core/constants.go:18.
  • Emergency guard: common/emergencyGuard.go, data/transaction/emergencyGuard.go,
    core/process/block/preprocess/transactions.go, node/node.go.
  • Fork flag: config/enableEpochs.go, config/node/enableEpochs.yaml, core/fork/forks.go,
    core/interface.go.
  • Regression test: core/kapp/market/market_test.go
    (TestMarketKApp_ExecuteBuyMarket_RoyaltyReferralInflation).

References

@fbsobreira fbsobreira published to klever-io/klever-go Jun 22, 2026
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database Aug 28, 2026
Reviewed Aug 28, 2026
Last updated Aug 28, 2026

Severity

Critical

CVSS overall score

This score calculates overall vulnerability severity from 0 to 10 and is based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
/ 10

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector
Network
Attack complexity
Low
Privileges required
Low
User interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
High

CVSS v3 base metrics

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H

EPSS score

Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS)

This score estimates the probability of this vulnerability being exploited within the next 30 days. Data provided by FIRST.
(22nd percentile)

Weaknesses

Integer Underflow (Wrap or Wraparound)

The product subtracts one value from another, such that the result is less than the minimum allowable integer value, which produces a value that is not equal to the correct result. Learn more on MITRE.

Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition

The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check. Learn more on MITRE.

Incorrect Calculation

The product performs a calculation that generates incorrect or unintended results that are later used in security-critical decisions or resource management. Learn more on MITRE.

CVE ID

CVE-2026-54754

GHSA ID

GHSA-p7gw-2pcp-5pf8

Source code

Credits

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